Abduction of generalizations by Gauderis, Tjerk & Van De Putte, Frederik
Abduction of Generalizations
November 15, 2011
Abstract
Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hy-
potheses are formed for an observed, yet puzzling generalization such
as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks
through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in for-
mal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this
lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this
process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and daily life reasoning.
Second, the adaptive logic LA∀ is presented to explicate this process for-
mally.
keywords: hypothesis formation – abduction patterns – adaptive log-
ics
1 Introduction
Abduction is generally defined as “the process of forming an explanatory hy-
pothesis” [22, p. 216]. In this paper we will focus on a specific “pattern of
abduction” (to use a phrase introduced by Schurz [23]). Consider the following
example [23, p. 212]:
Pineapples taste sweet.
Everything that contains sugar, tastes sweet.
Pineapples contain sugar.
Inferences of this kind have been called “law abduction” [23], or “rule ab-
duction” [24]. As “law” and “rule” are heavily debated concepts in philosophy
(of science), we will use the more neutral term abduction of generalizations
(henceforth AG) for this specific pattern. More examples and a general char-
acterization of AG will be presented in Section 2. It will be argued that this
pattern is ubiquitous in both everyday and scientific reasoning, and is commonly
recognized as a useful – be it fallible – way to extend one’s knowledge.
Notwithstanding the importance of AG, little effort has been made so far to
study the characteristics of this inference pattern, and to explicate it by means
of a formal logic. As will be explained in Section 2.2, most scholars in AI and
formal logic have focused on singular fact abduction, whereas philosophers of
science have taken a more general, but informal point of view on abduction. It
is our aim to treat AG as a distinct subject matter, and to see how one may
understand and formalize it.
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Outline A first analysis of AG is provided in Section 2. We describe this
pattern informally, showing that it is a widespread inference pattern; secondly,
we explain why it has been neglected in formal logic and philosophy of science;
finally, we argue for the specific importance of AG in scientific contexts.
In Section 3, we turn our focus to problems that emerge when representing
AG formally. We argue that a distinction in the object language is needed
between what we call mere generalizations and the explanatory framework for
any logic that models AG; and, moreover, that this distinction is useful in any
logic for abduction. As AG is a non-monotonic inference form, we also discuss
how the dynamic features can be represented.
In the last section before the conclusion, Section 4, the logic LA∀ is pre-
sented. This is a logic for AG, formulated in the standard format of adaptive
logics. After we argue why this framework is well-suited for the current appli-
cation, we will illustrate the proof theory of LA∀, which allows us to model the
dynamic interaction of AG and classical inferences.
Preliminaries Let L be the standard language of classical first-order pred-
icate logic, obtained from a set of constants C = {a, b, c, . . .}, a set of vari-
ables V = {x, y, z, . . .}, a set of predicates P = {P,Q,R, . . .}, the connectives
¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡ and quantifiers ∀,∃. W is the set of formulas in L. Depending on
the context, A,B,C are used either as metavariables for members of W, or for
(conglomerates of) predicates, e.g. (P ∧Q) ∨ (¬R). The metavariables α, β, . . .
refer to constants and variables.
2 Abduction of General Explanations
2.1 The phenomenon
We define abduction of generalizations (AG) as every inference that fits the
following pattern:
It is observed that all A are B.1
Also, being C is regarded as an explanation for being B.
Therefore, the hypothesis that all A are C is raised.
Hence, by AG we generate hypotheses that explain why all observed objects of
a certain class have a specific property. In Section 3, we will explain how this
definition can be operationalized in a first-order modal language. But first, let
us point out some general characteristics of AG.
First of all, AG is a specific form of classical abduction as defined by Peirce
[21, 5.189]:
The surprising fact, X, is observed;
But if Y were true, X would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that Y is true.2
1Strictly speaking, this is shorthand for “All observed A are B, and therefore it is believed
that all A are B.”
2To avoid confusion, the schematic letters A and C originally used by Peirce are replaced
by X and Y .
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In an AG both the surprising fact X and the hypothesis Y are generalizations,
respectively “all A are B”, and “all A are C”.
This definition leads to an important consideration about the Peircean or
classical notion of abduction: it is defined in a deterministic way, i.e. the truth
of Y implies X. Although we do not suggest that this notion of abduction
cannot be meaningfully extended to other accounts in which the motivation to
adopt the abductive hypothesis is, for instance, probabilistic (P (X|Y ) is high)
or comparative (P (X|Y ) > P (X|¬Y )), we restrict ourselves in this paper, as
most of the literature on abduction does, to the classical case. As it is also
assumed that Y explains X,3 this restriction will have consequences for the
formalization of AG in Section 3.1.
Secondly, AG is distinct from what is called singular fact abduction, in which
both the surprising fact and the hypothesis are singular facts. In a first-order
language, the surprising fact of a singular fact abduction is modeled as an object
having a certain property (such as Pa). In contrast, in AG it will be modeled
by a generalization (such as (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)). Existing models for abduction
usually limit themselves to singular fact abduction, as we will see in the next
section.
Thirdly, AG is not a novel reasoning pattern. It has been known at least
since Aristotle who treats something similar in his Posterior Analytica when he
considers the “middle term” of a definition. This pattern is, according to his
view, the essence of a good definition: it should not only say what the definien-
dum (A) is, it should also be an explanation (C) for its observed properties (B).
As an example, he explains why horned animals (A) lack upper incisors (B) by
defining horned animals as a subclass of animals that have inflected hard mate-
rial from their mouth to their heads (C). According to Aristotle, this is a good
definition of a class because it explains the properties of that class.4 However,
the reasoning pattern we are considering is much broader than what Aristotle
had in mind. A, B and C can be any properties, and neither should A be a
definiendum, nor C a definiens.
Fourthly, AG is frequently applied in human reasoning, often in combination
with or following an instance of singular fact abduction. For instance, people
do not only wonder why their heads hurt (they drank too much last night)
or why there is a thunderstorm (it was very hot during the day). Not much
of a reflective mind is needed to also start asking questions such as why it is
that every time one drinks a bit too much, one suffers from headaches, or why
thunderstorms often follow hot days. In other words, people do not only wonder
why certain facts are the case, they also wonder why certain regularities occur.
3Applying the above schema as such is only justified in case of abduction, i.e. the formation
of explanatory hypotheses. If Y does not explain X, flagrant examples of the logical fallacy
affirming the consequent that have little value qua hypothesis will be obtained.
4See [2, II.10] for Aristotle’s distinction between two types of definitions and [2, II.12-14]
for his view on the role of the middle term in a definition. A good treatment of the analogy
between Aristotelian definitions and Peircean abduction can be found in [10]. In our opinion,
Schurz refers in [23] to the wrong concept when he links AG (in his words: law abduction)
to Aristotle. The concept “hitting upon the middle term” is only employed in the definition
of quick wit [2, I.34], in which it is illustrated with an example of a singular fact abduction.
In our view, a predecessor of AG can only be found in Aristotle’s treatment of the role of the
middle term in definitions.
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2.2 The Lack of Models for AG
The lack of models for AG will be explained by pointing out how the application
of the concept of abduction in a variety of fields has caused a growing divergence
in definitions and interpretations. This will also clarify the relation between our
current project and the literature on abduction.
Broadly speaking, two main currents in research on abduction can be dis-
cerned. On the one hand, research in AI and formal logic mostly focuses on
a syllogistic interpretation of Peirce’s work, in which abduction is introduced
as part of a tripod that is clarified with the following famous beans-example of
Peirce [21, 2.623]:
All the beans from this bag are white. (Rule)
These beans are from this bag. (Case)
These beans are white. (Result)
All reasoning deriving a result from a case and a rule is called deductive, all
reasoning deriving a rule from a case and a result inductive, and all reasoning
deriving a case from a rule and a result abductive. Having this schema in mind,
researchers in AI or formal logic generally focus on instances of singular fact
abduction, which are variations on the following pattern:
Bα,∀β(Aβ → Bβ)/Aα
This pattern is usually combined with the condition that the hypothesis should
be explanatory. Aliseda even adds a further condition suggested by Peirce,
i.e. that the observed fact should be surprising (in the sense that Bα cannot
be derived from the background theory alone) [1]. One noteable exception to
the exclusive focus on singular fact abduction is Thagard [24]. He obtains a
reconstruction of AG, which he calls “rule abduction”, by adding to his logic
program PI the ability to generalize the results of a singular fact abduction.
On the other hand, research in philosophy of science usually departs from
a methodological interpretation of Peirce. In his later writings Peirce distin-
guishes abduction, induction and deduction as different steps in a methodology
of science [22, p. 212–218]. Abduction is the process of forming an explana-
tory hypothesis, from which deduction can draw predictions, which then can
be tested by induction.5 Research in this tradition, see e.g. [17, 23], considers
abduction as a very broad concept including analogical reasoning, visual abduc-
tion, common cause reasoning, etc. Here, Peirce’s definition of abduction (see
Section 2.1) is seen as an expression in metalanguage, in which a “fact” could
be any proposition. Some, see e.g. [12, 16, 9], still try to capture the concept of
abduction under the single schema of inference to the best explanation (IBE).6
However, these attempts to reduce the broadness of the considered concept pre-
vent the discovery of interesting features of more specific patterns of abduction.
Schurz explains this as follows [23, p. 205]:
5It is generally acknowledged (see e.g. [11, p. 5–8]) that both interpretations can be found
in Peirce’s work, although they are not fully compatible. They represent an evolution in
his thinking, as he hinted himself when he remarked that he “was too much taken up in
considering syllogistic forms” [21, 2.102].
6These scholars consider Peirce’s remark that abduction should be as economical as possible
[21, 7.220], as an essential and crucial condition.
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The majority of the recent literature on abduction has aimed at one
most general schema of abduction (for example IBE) which matches
every particular case. I do not think that good heuristic rules for
generating explanatory hypotheses can be found along this route,
because these rules are dependent of the specific type of abduction
scenario.
In this article, Schurz subsequently presents a taxonomy of distinct patterns of
abduction. Having this in mind, we think that it is best to remain pluralistic on
the logical form of abduction. We should maintain the rich concept of abduction
as it is understood in the philosophy of science, but, in order to provide the
formal rigor which is characteristic of the logic and AI community, we have to
focus on each of the different specific forms of abduction separately.
2.3 The Ubiquity of AG in Scientific Practice
At the end of Section 2.1, we mentioned several examples in which abduction of
generalizations is triggered by a question concerning the result of a singular fact
abduction. This question is brought up by a need for a deeper understanding
of the observed relations. We can recognize this curious spirit in the endeav-
ors of many scientists. For instance, Descartes was not satisfied with the folk
explanation of the rainbow, i.e. that a rainbow appears because the sun breaks
through shortly after a rain shower. He wanted to understand why rainbows
appear whenever the sun shines while it rains. We will argue that AG is at least
as important in scientific practice as singular fact abduction by considering two
general characteristics of this practice.7
Firstly, in scientific practice one attempts to formulate theories, which have
both a universal and falsifiable nature.8 One does not want an explanation
why, for instance, this particular person suffers from this disease. One wants
to understand why and how this disease is transmitted in general. Formulating
theories about particularities is seldom considered as good scientific practice;
such theories are often labeled as ad hoc. Theories are thus mainly formulated
for a whole class of objects and, by consequence, formulated in terms of gener-
alizations. These generalizations allow us to derive singular fact predictions by
means of which theories can be tested. Therefore, in the formation process of
such theories, reasoning methods resulting in generalizations, such as inductive
generalization or AG, are essential.
Secondly, augmented unification (as characterized, for instance, by [15]) is
generally seen as an indicator of scientific progress.9 Each application of AG is in
essence a unification step, because it explains an observational generalization,
e.g. “All A are B”, by characterizing its antecedent (A) as a subclass of a
more general class (C) for which the observed properties (B) hold. Therefore,
AG is a key method to enhance unification in scientific practice. The most
7This claim is about scientific practice and not about scientific explanation. In scientific
explanation, a scientific theory is employed to explain a certain fact (which can be either a
singular fact or a generalization). Scientific practice is the activity of forming such scientific
theories and expanding current scientific knowledge.
8Universality should not be taken as an absolute notion, but as an achievable level of
generality that is relative to the methods and scope of the specific field.
9Both the instrumentalist and realist view concerning the nature of scientific progress seem
to agree on this point [20].
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interesting examples in the history of science can be found when a new theory
is proposed as a solution for some anomalies of an existing theory. In that
case, the proponents of the new theory also need to show that most of the
already known and well-tested observational laws, which are explained by the
old theory, can be explained by the new theory. For instance, Newton could
explain Huygens’ pendulum law using his general laws of motion by pointing
out how the different parameters of the pendulum law could be translated into
his general mathematical framework. In the same way, Bohr could explain by
means of his atomic model why the wave lengths of the visible emission spectrum
of hydrogen can be calculated by the Balmer formula.
3 Introducing the Formal Framework
3.1 The Explanatory Framework
According to the definition of AG from Section 2, this pattern could be formally
explicated as follows:
(P1) ∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx)
(P2) ∀x(Cx ⊃ Bx)
(H) ∀x(Ax ⊃ Cx)
However, we must be careful here: the definition stipulates that C-hood ex-
plains B-hood, not just that everything that has the property C also has the
property B. In other words, where (P1) and (H) can be of any kind, the set
of possible candidates for (P2) is restricted.10 We call this set the explanatory
framework. It consists of all generalizations of the form ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx) where
being F provides an explanation for being G. Whether or not a generalization
belongs to the explanatory framework, may depend on the phenomenon we are
trying to explain. In other words, it is contextually defined. All we assume is
that it is clear for each generalization, given the abductive problem at hand,
whether it is a member of the explanatory framework or not. In the latter case
we call it a mere generalization.
With this new terminology, we are now able to characterize all the lines
of the above schema: (P1) is the explanandum, i.e. the mere generalization
that is to be explained; (P2) is a generalization that is part of the explanatory
framework for the current abductive context; (H) is the explanatory hypothesis.
An explanation or explanans for (P1) consists of an explanatory hypothesis
together with one or more elements of the explanatory framework that connect
the hypothesis to the explanandum.
Now what does it actually mean that F -hood explains G-hood? Needless to
say, the philosophical literature abounds in theories of explanation. However, as
we chose to restrict ourselves to classical abduction, certain preconditions apply.
First, F -hood does not only explain G-hood, F -hood should also imply G-hood.
Second, as abduction is an inference, only argumentative accounts of explanation
are relevant. Hence, the choices to explicate the notion of “explanation” in
the definition of the explanatory framework of a (classical) abductive problem
10In our opinion, Schurz [23] puts too little emphasis on this point in his discussion of AG,
or “law abduction” as he calls it. In his schema, (P2) is called a “background law”, but as far
as we see, no explicit definition or circumscription is provided.
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are limited to accounts of explanation that have the structure of a deductive
argument such as a DN-argument (e.g. Hempel [14]), a causal argument (e.g.
Hausman [13]) or an augmented unification argument (e.g. Kitcher [15]).11
In any of these accounts, (P2) has a specific status – it must be either lawlike,
refer to an underlying causal mechanism, or be a more general argumentation
scheme. We use the more abstract term explanatory framework to express this
status of (P2). This specific status turns AG into a fundamentally asymmetric
inference. It is not possible to derive ∀x(Cx ⊃ Ax) from the same premises,
since A-hood does not explain B-hood. Hence, if a logic explicates AG, it
should be able to represent this asymmetry between (P1) and (P2) in its object
language.
Before we explain how this can be done, let us briefly give an extra reason
to motivate the distinction between the explanatory framework and mere gen-
eralizations as a valuable asset for any logic that models abductive processes in
general. Mere generalizations are often used in abductions that involve knowl-
edge about methods or procedures. Consider the following premises:
(P1) The Geiger counter produces audible clicks close to the object a.
(P2) If the Geiger counter produces audible clicks, β-radiation is present.
(P3) If an object contains C-14, β-radiation is emitted.
Without the distinction between the explanatory framework and mere general-
izations, a logic for singular fact abduction treats (P2) and (P3) as having the
same formal structure. But a physicist interested in explaining the presence
of β-radiation is only interested in the hypothesis suggested by (P3), as the
behaviour of the Geiger counter provides no explanation. On the other hand,
(P2) is needed to derive the fact that there is β-radiation in the first place (as it
is not directly observable). Hence, (P2) cannot be omitted from this abductive
reasoning context. Only a logic that is able to represent explanatory frameworks
can handle this case properly.
3.2 A Modal Approach
In Section 4, we will present the logic LA∀. This system is a non-monotonic
extension of the well-known logic T, and allows us to model instances of AG in
the modal language L. Therefore, let us first define L and T formally, after
which we add some comments on our choice for them.
Let L denote the extension of L with the modal necessity operator . The
set of formulas W is the smallest set for which the following holds:
For all A ∈ W : A,A ∈ W
For all A,B ∈ W : ¬A,A ∨B,A ∧B,A ⊃ B,A ≡ B ∈ W
Hence, ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) and Pa∨∃x(¬Rx) are, for instance, members ofW,
whereas ∀xPx or ∀xPx are not.
An axiomatization for the predicative version of T over the language W is
obtained by taking the axioms of classical predicate logic (henceforth CL), and
adding the following axioms (closed under modus ponens):
11It is not implied that there are no other valuable accounts of explanation. We only claim
that (classical) abductive hypotheses (the only ones that are our concern here) are part of a
deductive argument that forms an explanation for the explanandum.
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K (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
RN if ` A then ` A
T A ⊃ A
A semantics of T that is sound and complete with this axiomatization can be
found in [8, pp. 46-47].
The language L allows us to represent the premises involved in abductive
reasoning processes with the expressive power of classical first-order logic, but
gives us the extra operator , which allows us to indicate at the object level
that a certain generalization is in the explanatory framework. Let F◦ denote
the set of purely functional formulas, i.e. formulas that do not contain individual
constants, quantifiers, or sentential letters. For example, Px ∧ (Qxy ∨Rx) is a
purely functional formula, whereas Pa ∨Qxy and Px ∧ ∃yQxy are not. Where
A ∈ F◦, let ∀A be the universal quantification over every variable that is free in
A. The logic LA∀ treats any formula of the form ∀(A ⊃ B) with A,B ∈ F◦
as an element of the explanatory framework.
The choice for T as the monotonic core of LA∀ has two important conse-
quences. First of all, since T is an extension of CL, our logic for AG assumes
both our factual knowledge and our explanatory framework to be internally
consistent. Moreover, since the axioms of CL are valid in the scope of ,
classical logic consequences of the explanatory framework may themselves be
used to generate explanatory hypotheses. For instance, if ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) and
∀x(Qx ⊃ Rx) are premises of a particular abductive problem, not only these
formulas but also ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) will be part of the explanatory framework.
Second, in view of the axiom T (A ⊃ A), a generalization that is part of the
explanatory framework is also assumed to be true as such. This is the formal
expression of our restriction to the classical account of abduction, where “A
explains B” implies “A implies B”.
Our logic for AG is in a sense minimal: iterations of boxes are excluded, and
explanation is expressed by rather simple formal tools. It is a topic for further
research whether our model can be meaningfully extended to include specific,
more fine-grained accounts of explanation (e.g. adding asymmetric axioms to
specify causal arguments in the sense of Hausman [13]).
3.3 The Dynamics of AG
Apart from the distinction between the explanatory framework and mere gen-
eralizations, several other difficulties arise when we try to model abduction in
general, and AG in particular. First of all, abduction is a non-monotonic rea-
soning method: new information may contradict the hypotheses we have raised.
Moreover, it may not always be clear whether the currently available informa-
tion contradicts some of these hypotheses - this requires classical inferences,
which might not yet have been drawn. As a result, we can discern a double
dynamics in abductive reasoning: previously drawn inferences can become re-
tracted in view of additional premises, but also in view of further inferences
from the same body of evidence. A formal logic for AG should hence be able
to frame this double dynamics, yet still define a sensible and stable output for
any given premise set.
Second, every realistic model of AG should allow us to combine deductive
(or classical) inferences with ampliative (or supraclassical) steps. That is, it
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should allow the user to draw new inferences on the basis of previously inferred
hypotheses, and it should allow the classical consequences of the evidence to
falsify such hypotheses (and whatever we derived from them). This relates to a
third important desideratum, i.e. that the hypotheses yielded by a formal logic
for AG should be mutually consistent with the evidence and the explanatory
framework. Ampliative reasoning should not only allow us to go beyond the
mere deductive consequences of our knowledge, but it should also remain within
the boundaries of consistency.
The fourth problem is specific to the context of abduction: explanatory
hypotheses should be as parsimonious as possible. That is, if Y suffices to
explain the puzzling fact X, then we should not raise the explanatory hypothesis
“Y and Z”.
Finally, any logic for abduction should be able to handle cases of multiple
explanatory hypotheses in a consistent and uniform way – see Section 4.3 where
we discuss two distinct ways in which this can be done.
We chose to use the framework of adaptive logics (henceforth ALs) to for-
mulate the logic LA∀ for AG. ALs are powerful formal systems that explicate
various forms of defeasible reasoning such as reasoning on the basis of inconsis-
tent premises [5], inductive generalization [7], reasoning on the basis of conflict-
ing norms [3], etc. Several adaptive logics have also already been developed for
singular fact abduction [18, 4], and all of them were shown to meet the above
desiderata.
One of the most important developments within the AL program is the
definition of a canonical format, the so-called standard format for ALs. This
format encompasses a generic dynamic proof theory and a selection semantics.
A rich and attractive metatheory has been shown to hold generically for all ALs
in standard format (see [6]): they are sound and complete, have the reassurance
property, their consequence relation is idempotent, cautiously monotonic, etc.
Most ALs have been successfully expressed within this format, so it provides
a good basis for a unifying study of defeasible reasoning forms in general, and
patterns of abduction in particular.
The main motivation to choose this non-monotonic framework is its dynamic
proof theory, which enables us to construct proofs that are very similar to actual
human reasoning processes, as will become clear from the examples in Section
4. There we will also argue that each of the other desiderata from the current
section are met by LA∀.
4 The Logic LA∀
4.1 The Definition of LA∀
Let us briefly explain the general characteristics of adaptive logics in standard
format. These are characterized by a triple 〈LLL,Ω,x〉. The so-called lower
limit logic LLL is a monotonic, reflexive and transitive logic, the rules of which
are unconditionally valid in the AL. Ω is called the set of abnormalities; this
set is specified in terms of a logical form. Every AL strengthens its LLL by
allowing for a specific kind of defeasible inferences, which are determined by Ω
and the strategy x. This will be clarified below.
The adaptive logic LA∀ employs T as its lower limit logic. The set of
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abnormalities of LA∀ requires a bit more explanation. Consider once more the
inference schema of AG, using the formal representations introduced in Section
3:
(P1) ∀(A ⊃ B)
(P2) ∀(C ⊃ B)
(H) ∀(A ⊃ C)
The LA∀-abnormalities are all formulas which imply that the premises in the
above schema are true, whereas its conclusion is false, for a particular A, B and
C. To simplify notation, we introduce the following abbreviation:
A 6→C B =def ∀(A ⊃ B) ∧∀(C ⊃ B) ∧ ¬∀(A ⊃ C)
According to this definition, A 6→C B can be read as: “although all A are B,
and although C-hood explains B-hood, it is not the case that all A are C”.
Using this abbreviation, we can now define the set of abnormalities:
Ω = {A 6→C B | A,B,C ∈ F◦ and A,B,C share no predicates }
The restriction that A,B and C share no predicates is added to avoid self-
explanations.12
The strategy of LA∀ is reliability – we will explain its role in Section 4.2.13
There we will focus on the proof theory of LA∀, which allows us to explicate the
intereaction of AG and classical inferences. As for all ALs in standard format,
the LA∀-semantics is obtained from the same triple 〈T,Ω, reliability〉 – we refer
to [6] for a generic definition of the AL-semantics. In Section 4.3, we will present
some particular features of LA∀ that show how it meets the desiderata from
Section 3.3.
4.2 The Proof Theory of LA∀
The LA∀-proof theory is a mere instantiation of the generic proof theory for ALs
in standard format – see [6]. As spelled out before, inferences such as AG are by
definition defeasible. Hence if we want to formalize them, we should be able to
model the retraction of previously drawn conclusions in view of later insights.
For this purpose, a line in an LA∀-proof has – apart from a line number, a
formula and a justification – a fourth element, the condition. This condition
consists of n (∈ N) members of Ω, and it specifies the assumptions on which
the formula of that line is derived. More precisely, the formulas in this set are
assumed to be false until and unless proven otherwise. A line becomes defeated,
if one of these assumptions becomes untenable in light of further derivations in
the proof.
The inference rules of LA∀-proofs reduce to three generic rules. This requires
some notational conventions. For any finite Θ ⊂ Ω, let Dab(Θ) denote the
classical disjunction of the members of Θ. In general, we use the term Dab-
formula to refer to finite disjunctions of abnormalities. Where Γ is a premise
set, and where
12See e.g. [19, p. 221-222] where a similar restriction is motivated for the logic LAr, an
adaptive logic for singular fact abduction.
13ALs in standard format can also use the minimal abnormality strategy. However, as the
difference between both strategies is not relevant here, we restrict ourselves to the (slightly
less complicated) reliability-variant of LA∀.
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A ∆
abbreviates that A occurs in the proof on a line with the condition ∆, the
inference rules are given by the following generic rules:
PREM If A ∈ Γ:
...
...
A ∅
RU If A1, ..., An `T B: A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, ..., An `T B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
The premise rule PREM states that a premise may be introduced at any line
of a proof on the empty condition. The unconditional inference rule RU states
that, if A1, . . . , An `T B and A1, . . . , An occur in the proof on the conditions
∆1, . . . ,∆n, we may add B on the condition ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆n. The strength of
an adaptive logic comes with the third rule, the conditional inference rule RC,
which works analogously to RU, but allows us to push abnormalities from the
formula to the condition. Hence RC allows us to take defeasible steps based on
the assumption that the abnormalities are false.
To get an idea of how these generic rules allow us to model AG, consider the
formalization of the pineapple-example from the introduction:
Γ1 = {∀x(Px ⊃ Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx),∃xPx}
The last premise is added to avoid certain unwelcome results – see Section
4.3. Note that in view of the interpretation of the premises, this is a harmless
addition: if we want to explain the fact that all pineapples taste sweet, then it
seems evident that we also know that pineapples exist.
We start an LA∀-proof from Γ1 by writing down the premises:
1 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
Note that {∀x(Px ⊃ Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx)} `T ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) ∨ (P 6→R Q).
Hence we may apply the rule RU to derive ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx)∨ (P 6→R Q), and from
the latter, derive that all P are R by RC:
3 ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) ∨ (P 6→R Q) 1,2;RU ∅
4 ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) 3;RC {P 6→R Q}
The interesting aspect of adaptive logics is of course their dynamic flavor, which
can only be illustrated if we add more premises to Γ1. Suppose that we learn
about a genetically modified pineapple a, which contains no sugar, but never-
theless tastes sweet because it has been injected with a synthetic sweetener. So
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we have to add the premise Pa ∧ ¬Ra, which contradicts the derived explana-
tion. Let us call the extended premise set Γ2. A nice advantage of ALs is that,
since the proofs are dynamic, we need not start a proof all over again whenever
premises are added; we can just pick up where we ended our line of thought.
Hence we may continue our proof as follows:
...
...
...
...
4 ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) 3;RC {P 6→R Q} X7
5 Pa ∧ ¬Ra PREM ∅
6 ¬∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) 5;RU ∅
7 P 6→R Q 1,2,6;RU ∅
For the time being, ignore the X7-sign on line 4 – this will be clarified below.
At line 7, we have reached the insight that P 6→R Q follows from our premises
by T. Hence, we need a way to indicate that there is something wrong with
the condition of line 4. This is done by a marking criterion, which depends on
what we have derived so far. Let a stage of a proof be a list of lines, obtained
by application of the three generic rules. A proof is then a list of subsequent
stages. At every stage s, a marking definition stipulates which lines are marked
and which are not, and, hence, which have become marked or unmarked with
respect to the previous stage. If A is derived on an unmarked line at stage s,
we say that A is derived at stage s; otherwise, A is not derived at stage s.
For LA∀, a line is marked at stage s, whenever at this stage, a member of
its condition is derived on the empty condition, either by itself, or as part of a
minimal disjunction of abnormalities. In that case, we say that the condition
is unreliable at stage s. Putting everything together, we obtain the following
standard definitions:
Definition 1 A Dab-formula Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s iff
Dab(∆) is derived on the empty condition at stage s, and there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆
for which Dab(∆′) is derived on the empty condition at stage s.
Definition 2 The set of unreliable formulas Us(Γ) at stage s is the union of
all ∆ for which Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s.
Definition 3 (Marking for Reliability) The line i with condition ∆ is marked
at stage s iff ∆ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
In view of these definitions, line 4 is marked at stage 7 of the above proof, as
indicated by the X7-sign.
It is important to remark that, despite the dynamic character of the proofs,
adaptive logics are proper proof-invariant logics. Given a certain premise set,
an adaptive logic determines for every formula unambiguously whether it is part
of the consequence set. To avoid confusion with formulas that are derivable at
a certain stage of a proof (but can be defeated at a later stage), formulas in the
consequence set are called finally derivable. The final derivability relation of an
adaptive logic is defined as follows:
Definition 4 A formula A is finally derived from Γ at stage s of a proof if and
only if A is derived at line i, line i is not marked at stage s and every extension
of the proof in which i is marked may be further extended in such a way that
line i is unmarked.
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Definition 5 (Final Derivability) Γ `LA∀ A (A ∈ CnLA∀(Γ)) if and only if
A is finally derived in a LA∀-proof from Γ.
To illustrate the above definitions, consider again our proof from Γ2. Since the
Dab-formula at line 7 is minimal, line 4 will remain marked in every extension
of the proof. More generally, ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) is not finally derivable from Γ2, i.e.
there is no proof in which we can finally derive ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) from this premise
set.
4.3 Some Salient Features of the Logic
We end this section with a brief survey of the ways in which LA∀ solves some
typical problems for any formal model of abduction. First of all, as any AL in
standard format, LA∀ has the Reassurance property [6, Corollary 1]:
Theorem 1 If Γ is not T-trivial, then neither is CnLA∀(Γ). (Reassurance)
Theorem 1 implies that if our explanatory framework and our factual knowl-
edge are mutually consistent, then LA∀ will always yield a consistent set of
explanatory hypotheses. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that CL
is included in T and of the axiom T.
Second, as explained in Section 3.3, a logic for abduction should only yield
the most parsimonious hypotheses. Consider the following proof from Γ1:
1 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
3 ∀x((Rx ∧ Sx) ⊃ Qx) 2;RU ∅
4 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Rx ∧ Sx)) 1,3;RC {P 6→R∧S Q} X9
5 ∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) 4;RU {P 6→R∧S Q} X9
6 ∃xPx PREM ∅
7 ∃x(Px ∧ ¬Sx) ∨ ∃x(Px ∧ Sx) 6;RU ∅
8 ¬∀x(Px ⊃ (Rx ∧ Sx)) ∨ ¬∀x(Px ⊃ (Rx ∧ ¬Sx)) 7; RU ∅
9 (P 6→R∧S Q) ∨ (P 6→R∧¬S Q) 1,2,8;RU ∅
As the material implication has the property A ⊃ B ` (A ∧ C) ⊃ B (strength-
ening the antecedent), the hypothesis on line 5, which states that anything that
is P also has the random property S, could be derived. However, using the
premise ∃xPx, we can derive the Dab-formula on line 9 which defeats lines 4
and 5.
Third, the dynamic proof theory and the form of the abnormalities also
ensure that no hypotheses can be finally derived from tautologies, and that
no contradictions can be finally derived as a hypothesis. The following proof
from Γ1 illustrates how the logic enables us to defeat both self-contradictory
hypotheses and hypotheses derived from tautotologies – see line 3, resp. lines 7
and 8:
1 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x((Sx ∧ ¬Sx) ⊃ Qx) -;RU ∅
3 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Sx ∧ ¬Sx)) 1,2;RC {P 6→S∧¬S Q} X5
4 ∃xPx PREM ∅
5 ∃x(Px ∧ ¬(Sx ∧ ¬Sx)) 4;RU ∅
6 P 6→S∧¬S Q 1,2,5;RU ∅
7 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Sx ∨ ¬Sx)) -;RU ∅
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8 (∀x)(Tx ⊃ (Sx ∨ ¬Sx))) -;RU ∅
9 ∀x(Px ⊃ Tx) 1,2;RC {P 6→T (S ∨ ¬S)} X10
10 (P 6→T S ∨ ¬S) ∨ (P 6→¬T S ∨ ¬S) 4;RU ∅
The final feature that will be illustrated is how this logic handles multiple ex-
planatory hypotheses. Suppose that we learn about a property S, which explains
Q-hood just as well as the property R does. Hence we have to add the premise
∀x(Sx ⊃ Qx) to Γ1, which results in the following set:
Γ3 = {∀x(Px ⊃ Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx,∀x(Sx ⊃ Qx),∃xPx}
At first sight, both the hypotheses ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) and ∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) can be
derived from Γ3. But, as shown in the proof below, these two formulas are not
finally derivable.The composed hypothesis ∀x(Px ⊃ (Rx ∨ Sx)) is, however,
finally derivable from Γ3.
1 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
3 ∀x(Sx ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
4 ∀x(Px ⊃ Rx) 1,2;RC {P 6→R Q} X7
5 ∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) 1,3;RC {P 6→S Q} X8
6 ∃xPx PREM ∅
7 (P 6→R Q) ∨ (P 6→S∧¬R Q) 1,2,3,6;RU ∅
8 (P 6→S Q) ∨ (P 6→R∧¬S Q) 1,2,3,6;RU ∅
9 ∀x((Rx ∨ Sx) ⊃ Qx) 2,3;RU ∅
10 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Rx ∨ Sx)) 1,9;RC {P 6→R∨S Q}
In view of this last feature, LA∀ models a kind of practical abduction: when-
ever multiple explanatory hypotheses are available, LA∀ only allows for the
(undefeated) derivation of a disjunctive combination of these hypotheses. This
is opposed to theoretical abduction, in which each of the individual hypotheses
can be seperately derived. For a thorough discussion of this distinction, see [4].
5 Conclusion
As argued in this paper, abduction of generalizations (AG) is ubiquitous in
everyday and scientific reasoning. We provided a first general analysis of this
pattern, and argued that the notion of an explanatory framework should be
embodied in any formal model for AG. This suggestion was implemented in
LA∀, which is a very intuitive and well-behaved formal logic that allows us to
apply AG, and to withdraw its applications in those cases where a conflict with
the other premises occurs.
Several enrichments of our formal model can be studied in future research, in
order to deal with e.g. probabilistic information (see Section 2.1), causal argu-
ments (see Section 3.1), and abductive anomalies.14 Also, it seems worthwhile
to develop ways in which singular fact abduction and AG can be integrated in
the framework of adaptive logics. Finally, case studies of some of the exam-
ples mentioned in Section 2 may shed new light on the relation between AG,
unification and other patterns of abduction.
14In Aliseda’s terminology, an anomaly is a fact, the negation of which follows from our
background theory.
14
References
[1] Atocha Aliseda. Abductive Reasoning. Logical Investigations into Discovery
and Explanation. Springer, Dordrecht, 2006.
[2] Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. Online Publication, http://www.
logoslibrary.org/aristotle/posterior/index.html, n.d.
[3] Author, 2011.
[4] Author, 2011.
[5] Diderik Batens. Inconsistency-adaptive logics. In Logic at Work. Essays
dedicated to the memory of Helena Rasiowa, pages 445–472. Springer, 1999.
[6] Diderik Batens. A universal logic approach to adaptive logics. Logica
Universalis, 1:221–242, 2007.
[7] Diderik Batens. Logics for qualitative inductive generalization. Studia
Logica, 97:61–80, 2011.
[8] Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, Dagmar Provijn, and Liza Verhoeven. Some
adaptive logics for diagnosis. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11/12:39–65,
2003.
[9] Igor Douven. Abduction. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2011 edition, 2011.
[10] Umberto Eco. Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on three types of
Abduction. In U. Eco and A. Sebeok, editors, The Sign of Three: Dupin,
Holmes, Peirce, pages 198–220. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and
Indianapolis, 1983.
[11] Peter A. Flach and Antonis C. Kakas. Abductive and Inductive Reasoning:
Background and Issues. In Peter A. Flach and Antonis C. Kakas, editors,
Abduction and Induction. Essays on their Relation and their Integration,
pages 1–27. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2000.
[12] Gilbert H. Harman. The inference to the best explanation. Philosophical
Review, 74(1):88–95, 1965.
[13] Daniel M. Hausman. Causal Asymmetries. Cambridge University Press,
1998.
[14] Carl G. Hempel. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other essays in the
Philosophy of Science. Free Press, New York, 1965.
[15] P. Kitcher. The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objec-
tivity without Illusions. Oxford University Press, 1993.
[16] Peter Lipton. Inference to the best explanation (2nd edition). Rout-
ledge/Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2004.
[17] Lorenzo Magnani. Abductive Cognition: The Epistemological and Eco-
Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning. Springer, Berlin Heidel-
berg, 2009.
15
[18] Joke Meheus. A Formal Logic for The Abduction of Singluar Hypothe-
sis. unpublished paper, available at http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/
preprints/fma3.pdf.
[19] Joke Meheus and Diderik Batens. A formal logic for abductive reasoning.
Logic Journal of the IGPL, 14:221–236, 2006.
[20] Ilkka Niiniluoto. Scientific progress. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2011 edition, 2011.
[21] Charles S. Peirce. Collected Papers. Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958.
[22] Charles S. Peirce. The Essential Peirce, volume 2. Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1998.
[23] Gerhard Schurz. Patterns of Abduction. Synthese, 164:201–234, 2008.
[24] Paul Thagard. Computational Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachussetts, 1988.
16
